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Abstract—ICT in smart grid provides enormous opportunities
for real-time and wide-area grid monitoring, protection and
control. To this aim, synchrophasor technology was proposed for
reliable and secure transmission of grid status information. IEEE
C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 emerged as two well known com-
munication frameworks for synchrophasor technology. However,
literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of some key features
and limitations. Further, knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities in
both communication frameworks is still quite limited. This pa-
per analyzes characteristics of both communication frameworks
inferred from their complete implementation. In particular, it
addresses their embedded features, required network character-
istics/resources and their resilience against cyber attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Synchrophasor technology has the potential to become an
integral part of modern power systems. It involves transmission
of electrical quantities measured across different parts of the
grid synchronized to a common precise time source e.g.,
GPS [1]. Today, numerous synchrophasor applications on
Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection And Control (WAMPAC)
have been developed including but not limited to islanding
detection, grid dynamics recording/visualization, determining
stability margins, enhancing situational awareness etc [2]–[4].
At present, there are two well-known communication frame-
works for synchrophasor technology; IEEE C37.118 and
IEC 61850-90-5. Initially published in 2005, IEEE C37.118
emerged as the most successful synchrophasor communication
framework and is widely adopted [5]. However, research still
lacks a proper analysis of its requirements, limitations and
security challenges. Whereas, IEC 61850-90-5 was published
in 2012 with several unique features [6]. However, its adoption
is still quite limited and proper investigation of its features,
requirements and limitations is required.
This paper summarizes findings inferred from a complete
implementation of both, IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5
and provides detailed comparison of their features and capabil-
ities. Due to the involvement of critical infrastructure in syn-
chrophasor applications, communication security is crucial. To
this aim, this paper analyzes both communication frameworks
considering security attributes such as confidentiality, integrity
and availability. Further, the paper also explores vulnerabilities
which could be exploited by intruders in single or multi-stage
attacks to leave different power system components unable
to communicate or unintentionally performing actions. This
may result in severe damage to physical equipment. In short,
the main contributions of the paper include: (i) features and
limitations analysis of available synchrophasor communication
frameworks, (ii) security and cyber vulnerabilities analysis,
and (iii) identifying required network characteristics/resources.
II. RELATED WORK
Several research efforts focused on the design of a suitable
synchrophasor communication framework [7]. IEEE published
a series of standards that were revised over time. Authors in [5]
explained the evolution of IEEE C37.118 from IEEE 1344 and
also highlighted key differences between old and new versions.
Similarly, IEC 61850-90-5 originally evolved from IEC 61850
in 2012. Authors in [8] explained the evolution of IEC 61850-
90-5 and addressed challenges in its commissioning.
The adoption of communication frameworks and creation
of suitable interface in Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) and
Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) have been addressed in [9].
Authors have addressed practical aspects and requirements for
the design of WAMPAC based on IEEE C37.118 and IEC
61850-90-5. Further, an open source OpenPMU project has
been addressed in [10], which integrates IEEE C37.118 as
communication protocol in the PMU. A similar work focusing
on the importance of IP-based communication and especially
the use of multicast has been presented by Seewald [11].
Synchrophasor systems frequently involve communication
over insecure networks (e.g., Internet) which makes commu-
nication security crucial. Most research in literature focuses
on addressing security challenges and cyber vulnerabilities for
power systems in general but few have addressed synchropha-
sor systems. Authors in [12] outlined cyber security testing
of components (e.g., PMUs, PDCs) from multiple vendors
against port scanning, network congestions, protocol mutation,
denial of service etc. Authors in [13] identified that C37.118
communication is vulnerable and a secure VPN is necessary
to prevent packet modification/injection and eavesdropping on
network traffic by external attackers. A similar work in [14]
proposed a multi-layer architecture protected through firewall
and VPN enabled security gateways which prevents access
of external attackers to local power system network. The
VPN tunnel securely encapsulates IEEE C37.118 messages
to mitigate against potential cyber risks. Vulnerabilities in
IEEE C37.118 have also been highlighted in [15] through
demonstration of SQL injection attack. Authors concluded that
such attack could be easily launched due to unencrypted traffic
and lack of sanitization by the receiver. The literature still lacks
to address security features of IEC 61850-90-5.
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Figure 1. Generic synchrophasor system.
III. GENERIC SYNCHROPHASOR MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
A synchrophasor system in general consists of PMUs,
PDCs, communication network and control, monitoring or
visualization application as depicted in Fig. 1. A PMU is a
device that performs synchrophasor measurements from one
or more voltage/current waveforms. It may operate either in
commanded mode (i.e., its operations can be controlled by its
remote peer) or spontaneous mode (i.e., it cannot receive con-
trol messages from its remote peer). It transmits synchrophasor
data to remote peers either in unicast or multicast fashion. The
remote peer may be either a PDC or control or monitoring
center application. A PDC is a device that receives data from
multiple PMUs (or other PDCs), aggregates and transmits as a
single output stream. The generic synchrophasor system shown
in Fig. 1 consists of two levels of PDCs; local/substation PDCs
and control center or super PDCs. Local PDCs receive data
from multiple PMUs inside substation whereas control center
PDCs receive data from multiple substation PDCs.
IV. COMMUNICATION FRAMEWORKS
This section analyzes unique features and highlights limita-
tions of available synchrophasor communication frameworks.
A. IEEE C37.118 Communication System
IEEE C37.118 is the improved version of IEEE 1344
which was the first available synchrophasor communication
standard. It defines methods for evaluation of synchrophasor
measurements, time synchronization, application of time-tags
and format of messages exchanged over the network. It does
not put any restriction on the communication mode, protocol
or media and messages can be transmitted in unicast, mul-
ticast or broadcast fashion over any communication medium
and transport protocol. Originally, IEEE C37.118 addressed
the performance of synchrophasors only under steady state
conditions ignoring system disturbances and noise. However, a
revision of IEEE C37.118 in 2011 accounts for more precision
and support for dynamic power system conditions.
IEEE C37.118 describes four types of messages: data,
configuration, header and command. Data messages are used
to send actual real time measurements made by the PMU. Data
from multiple PMUs may be transmitted in a single message
correlated to a particular time stamp (i.e., PDC functionality).
Configuration messages are in machine-readable format and
contain information about calibration factors, data types and
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Figure 2. Generic IEEE C37.118-2 communication scenario with data source
operating in commanded mode.
other meta data required by proper decoding of data mes-
sages by the receiver. Configuration messages are of three
different types: CFG-1, CFG-2 and CFG-3. CFG-1 represents
type of data and capability of PMU/PDU. CFG-2 indicates
the synchrophasor measurements which are currently being
transmitted/reported. Whereas, CFG-3 is similar to CFG-2 but
contains some added flexibility and information about PMU
characteristics and measurements. Header messages contain
descriptive information (e.g., filtering, scaling algorithms etc)
which is sent by the PMU/PDC but actually provided by the
user. Command messages are used to control the operation
of device sending synchrophasor measurements. In short,
data, configuration and command messages are expressed in
machine-readable format while header is descriptive informa-
tion in human-readable format. Further, data, configuration
and header are the message types sent by the data sources
whereas command message is received by the data sources.
The communication scenario is depicted in Fig. 2.
IEEE C37.118 has several limitations: (i) the lack of stan-
dard data names prevent auto-discovery and self-description
without knowledge of configuration message, (ii) vendor spe-
cific features and customization weaken interoperability and
integration support, and (iii) no built-in security mechanism.
B. IEC 61850-90-5 Communication System
IEC 61850-90-5 is derived from IEC 61850 which was
initially proposed for substation automation. IEC 61850 is a
complete communication system that addresses modeling of
power system components, abstraction of services and com-
munication protocols and methods [16]. It was designed with
several objectives in mind: (i) interoperability and integration
between power system components from different vendors,
(ii) device/service modeling, (iii) self description and object
auto-discovery due to structured meta-data, (iv) reliability
mechanism through retransmission, (v) reduced substation cost
through multicast and replacing of expensive relay-to-relay
wiring with wireless communication, and (vi) support for
machine to machine sharing of configuration data using Sub-
station Configuration Language (SCL). However, IEC 61850
also has limitations including lack of security mechanism
and restricted communication to only the local network. IEC
61850-90-5 inherits all the features of IEC 61850 while also
overcoming its limitations. The key differences between IEC
61850 and IEC 61850-90-5 are shown in Fig. 3. IEC 61850-
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Figure 3. Difference between IEC 61850 and IEC 61850-90-5 protocol stack.
Table I
SUMMARY OF SUPPORTED FEATURES AND CAPABILITIES.
IEEE C37.118 IEC 61850-90-5
Device/Service Modeling No Yes
Interoperability & Integration Limited Yes
Self Description No Yes
Auto-discovery No Limited
Local Network Communication Supported Supported
Wide-area Communication Supported Supported
Transport Protocols Not-Specified Specified
Communication Reliability Only if TCP Built-in
Multicast Possible Possible
Security/Encryption No Yes
Key-based Signature No Yes
90-5 includes a security mechanism based on Group Domain
of Interpretation (GDOI) and also allows transmission of
time-critical protocols over wide-area networks by relying on
transport and network layer protocols.
As shown in Fig. 3, IEC 61850-90-5 consists of two time
critical protocols; Sampled Values (SV) and Generic Object
Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE), both designed to operate
in multicast fashion. SV is stream based whereas GOOSE is
event based messaging protocol. SV is the most suitable pro-
tocol for applications involving stream-based synchrophasor
data transmissions. The data inside SV and GOOSE proto-
cols is protected through encryption and signature algorithms
which rely on a secret key. The secret key is provided by
GDOI with assigned validity (TimeToNextKey attribute) and
is periodically replaced with a new one. The security attributes
can be observed in Wireshark capture (shown in Fig. 4) from
our implemented IEC 61850-90-5 libraries. It can be observed
in Fig. 4 that the encryption and signature calculation can
be performed using any supported algorithm. The receiver
determines the algorithms based on their identification tags
in received packets. Table I summarizes key features of IEEE
C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. IEEE C37.118 clearly lacks
several features reported in Table I.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security of the synchrophasor communication frameworks
is crucial as any incorrect information could cause severe
damage to physical equipment. This section compares IEEE
C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 from a security point of view
and analyzes their degree of resistance/protection against dif-
ferent cyber attacks. The analysis is performed using CIA
(Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability), a widely adopted
model for cyber security. Table II summarizes the analysis.
Figure 4. Captured packet with developed Wireshark plug-in from our
implemented IEC 61850-90-5 libraries.
A. Confidentiality
Confidentiality deals with information privacy when packets
are being transmitted over insecure networks. It prevents
attackers access to the sensitive information sent inside pack-
ets. Confidentiality in communication is normally achieved
through encryption. This allows only intended recipients able
to decode packets with the knowledge of encryption algorithm
and secret key. IEC 61850-90-5 has built-in security mecha-
nism based on GDOI and assumes that Key Distribution Center
(KDC) and communicating devices are secure. The strength of
confidentiality in IEC 61850-90-5 is very high due to periodic
refreshing of secret key by GDOI. Whereas, IEEE C37.118
offers no confidentiality as it lacks such a security mechanism.
B. Integrity
Integrity deals with accuracy and trustworthiness of data.
It ensures that the packets have not been altered during
transit. Non-repudiation is sometimes also regarded as part
of integrity and ensures that a sending device cannot deny
of sending a specific packet. IEEE C37.118 includes Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) code inside packets which ensures
integrity against any modification. However, the CRC code is
calculated using a predefined algorithm without using a secret
key. Thus, an intruder may get access to the packet, modify its
content, easily recalculate a new CRC code and transmit the
modified packet to the receiver. The receiver will fail to detect
unauthorized modification to packet content as it will pass the
CRC verification process. On the other hand, IEC 61850-90-5
includes cryptographic signature inside packets using a secret
key. This enables the receiver to easily detect unauthorized
modifications even if no encryption is used.
C. Availability
Availability ensures uninterrupted communication between
sender and receiver. Such attacks can be achieved by bom-
barding a receiving device with non-relevant or spam packets
to exhaust its resources and prevent it from processing packets
from intended/authorized senders. Availability can be targeted
Table II
SUMMARY OF SECURITY ANALYSIS.
IEEE C37.118 IEC 61850-90-5
Confidentiality None Strong
Integrity Weak Strong
Availability Vulnerable Vulnerable
in both IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. However, avail-
ability attacks could be mitigated in IEC 61850-90-5 to some
degree due to forming a group of authorized devices. The
GDOI security mechanism mitigates against an unauthorized
device being able to communicate with authorized devices.
A device may simply discard packets without processing if
received from unauthorized devices using a cookie mechanism.
D. Resilience Against Cyber Attacks
Vulnerabilities in communication could be exploited in the
form of different attacks to impair the communication or cause
damage to the physical equipment in a synchrophasor system.
Reconnaissance attacks could take place on the network traffic
to discover vulnerabilities such as open ports at a receiver, pro-
tocol types, unencrypted packets etc. Itself, it is not a harmful
attack but an attacker may exploit discovered vulnerabilities
to launch severe attacks e.g., authentication/access, denial of
service etc. Due to no encryption, eavesdropping on IEEE
C37.118 traffic could reveal useful information to an attacker
e.g., name and current state of substation, location of devices
(PMUs, breakers etc), communication configurations etc.
An attacker may launch authentication or access attack
to get unauthorized access to information. Such an attack
could be launched on a physical device or network traffic (by
inspecting packet content). With no authentication process in
IEEE C37.118, it is possible that a device assumes data is
received from genuine sender but it may indeed generated by
an intruder. This allows an intruder to control functionalities
of the receiving device. IEC 61850-90-5 is protected against
unauthorized access attacks as security credentials are only
known to GDOI authorized devices (assuming that KDC
and communicating devices are secure). Replay or reflection
is another similar attack. It stores network traffic between
communicating peers and replays it to the receiver to hide
real time status of the sender (e.g., power system). The out-
dated replayed packets will leave receiver unintentionally per-
forming wrong decisions. Replay/reflection attacks could be
launched on both, unencrypted (e.g., IEEE C37.118) as well as
encrypted (e.g., IEC 61850-90-5) traffic. However, the GDOI
based security mechanism of IEC 61850-90-5 prevents such
attacks by using short validity period for security credentials.
Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks are normally consid-
ered very harmful.These attacks intercept packets in transit,
alter them and send modified packets to the receiver. In case
of IEEE C37.118, a receiving device could be easily deceived
about the authenticity of the packets and unintentionally
perform wrong decisions. E.g., MITM attack on the config-
uration message of IEEE C37.118 could permanently leave
a receiver unable to decode upcoming data messages (i.e.,
Table III
RESILIENCE AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS.
Attack Type IEEE C37.118 IEC 61850-90-5
Reconnaissance Vulnerable Protected
Authentication/Access Vulnerable Protected
Replay/Reflection Vulnerable Protected
Man In The Middle Vulnerable Protected
Denial of Service Vulnerable Vulnerable
actual synchrophasors). IEC 61850-90-5 based communication
is protected against MITM attacks due to encryption.
Another common attack in communication system is Denial
of Service (DoS) which targets availability (addressed in
Section V-C). As addressed before, both IEEE C37.118 and
IEC 61850-90-5 are vulnerable to DoS/availability attacks.
However, it could be mitigated to some degree in IEC 61850-
90-5 communication. Table III summarizes resilience of IEEE
C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 against different cyber attacks.
E. Protection using Secure VPN
Protection against cyber attacks can be achieved by using
secure VPN. The VPN technology securely connects two
remote devices or networks over insecure network using au-
thentication, tunneling and encryption. Normally in corporate
environment, a secure tunnel is established between VPN
gateways of two remote networks e.g., a VPN tunnel can
be established between gateways of substation and control
center networks in Fig. 1. All PMUs in Fig. 1 will send
synchrophasor data normally which will be encapsulated by
substation gateway into VPN tunnel before traversing insecure
Internet and de-capsulated by control center gateway back into
original packets. VPN technology can be adopted for both,
IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 but is more beneficial
for IEEE C37.118 due to its no built-in security mechanism.
VPN ensures confidentiality and integrity, availability is still
vulnerable. The absolute protection against DoS attacks is
hard to achieve. Although, VPN technology provides privacy,
security and freedom, it has also few limitations: (1) it provides
protection from external attackers but vulnerabilities in Table
III remain valid for internal attacks (unless each PMU uses
its own dedicated VPN tunnel with control center), (2) it
increases the overall communication overhead and bandwidth
requirement due to encapsulation, (3) it has reduced reliability
and increased latency depending on the number, location and
performance of VPN servers, (4) it assumes that the VPN peers
are protected from any kind of malware, (5) due to immature
standards, VPN technology from different vendors may face
interoperability issues, (6) VPN tunnel normally uses fix
security unlike IEC 61850-90-5 whose security credentials are
refreshed periodically for protection against cryptanalysis, (7)
ISPs in some countries block VPN traffic due to government
regulations on keeping track of Internet activities/traffic.
VI. NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS
This section briefly compares the synchrophasor commu-
nication frameworks in terms of packet size, communication
overhead and required bandwidth. The reported results assume
that each data packet is carrying 2 analog and phasor values,
Table IV
SUMMARY OF NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS.
OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
IEEE C37.118 IEC 61850-90-5
Data Config. Command Header SV GOOSE
RealInfo 26.83% 86.70% 3.33% 21.62% 50.16% 56.48%
Formatting 21.95% 3.67% 26.67% 21.62% 36.25% 31.41%
Total Overhead 73.17% 13.3% 96.67% 78.38 49.84% 43.52%
BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENT
IEEE C37.118 IEC 61850-90-5
Data Messages SV GOOSE
With UDP 65.6 kbps 0.247 Mbps 0.278 Mbps
With TCP 84.8 kbps – –
Note: Overhead analysis presents percentage of real information, protocol formatting
and total overhead (includes protocol formatting plus communication i.e., headers) in
a single packet sent over UDP. The bandwidth requirement assumes 100 messages per
second as data transmission rate over UDP or persistent TCP connection.
1 digital word, frequency in integer and rate of change of
frequency in floating point format. These settings are also re-
flected in IEEE C37.118 configuration message. It is assumed
that IEC 61850-90-5 is carrying dataset of size 74 Bytes based
on implementations in [10].
A. Communication Overhead
The overhead indirectly reflects the maximum size of data
that can be included in a single packet (i.e., PDC aggregating
data from multiple PMUs). It is also a factor determining
how much additional channel bandwidth is required due to
overhead information. High communication overhead for syn-
chrophasor applications which involve high data transmission
rates significantly increases the channel bandwidth require-
ment. It can be observed in Table IV that the communication
overhead for IEEE C37.118 is significantly high while lower
for IEC 61850-90-5. The IEEE C37.118 overhead will further
increase if TCP is used as transport protocol.
B. Bandwidth Requirements
The channel bandwidth requirement depends on the mes-
sage size and rate of data transmission. It increases rapidly
if bulk packets are transmitted at higher rates (i.e., PDC
aggregating data from large number of PMUs). To avoid traffic
congestion and packet loss, minimum required bandwidth
should be available for synchrophasor applications. It can be
observed in Table IV that IEEE C37.118 has lower network
bandwidth requirement although has higher communication
overhead compared to IEC 61850-90-5. It is due to the fact
that IEC 61850-90-5 has large packet size due to metadata
and carrying complete decoding information in each packet.
IEEE C37.118 data messages are very compact in size due
to reporting configuration/decoding information separately in
infrequent configuration message, resulting in much lower
bandwidth requirement.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
At present, two established communication frameworks are
available for synchrophasor systems; IEEE C37.118 and IEC
61850-90-5. A comparison of both communication frame-
works can enable synchrophasor application developers to
choose the right protocol based on their requirements and
available resources. However, existing research literature lacks
a comparison of certain features and specifically cyber secu-
rity. IEEE C37.118 has been widely studied in literature and
some previous works have pointed out its cyber vulnerabil-
ities (as addressed in Section II). However, it superiority or
inferiority over IEC 61850-90-5 in terms of security features,
network requirements or embedded features and capabilities
need to be investigated.
This paper has analyzed findings inferred from the imple-
mentation of both communication frameworks. The findings
were classified into three categories: (i) supported features
and capabilities (summarized in Table I), (ii) security analysis
based on CIA model and resilience against cyber attacks
(summarized in Table II & Table III, respectively), and (iii)
network characteristics and required resources (summarized in
Table IV). IEEE C37.118 is a weak communication framework
from a security point of view due to no built-in security mech-
anism. On the other hand, IEC 61850-90-5 provides strong
protection against cyber attacks by relying on GDOI based
security mechanism. However, this assumes the KDC and
communicating devices secure from unauthorized access. In
terms of required network resources, IEEE C37.118 is highly
efficient with very small packet size compared to IEC 61850-
90-5. This results in much lower bandwidth requirement for
IEEE C37.118 compared to IEC 61850-90-5.
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